Advancement of Photospheric Radius Expansion and Clocked Type-I X-Ray Burst Models with the New

We report the first (in)elastic scattering measurement of ^{25}Al+p with the capability to select and measure in a broad energy range the proton resonances in ^{26}Si contributing to the ^{22}Mg(α,p) reaction at type I x-ray burst energies. We measured spin-parities of four resonances above the α threshold of ^{26}Si that are found to strongly impact the ^{22}Mg(α,p) rate. The new rate advances a state-of-the-art model to remarkably reproduce light curves of the GS 1826-24 clocked burster with mean deviation <9% and permits us to discover a strong correlation between the He abundance in the accreting envelope of the photospheric radius expansion burster and the dominance of ^{22}Mg(α,p) branch.

Effects of a monetary incentive on primary care prescribing in Ireland: changes in prescribing patterns in one health board 1990-1995.

BACKGROUND: In an attempt to curb the rapidly rising costs of primary care prescribing in Ireland, the government introduced a financial incentive scheme in 1993, to encourage general practitioners to restrain their prescribing. PURPOSE: To investigate the effects of a financial incentive scheme on GP prescribing in Ireland on prescribing costs and volume, and on some specific therapeutic areas. METHODS: Prescribing for 3 years before (1990-1992) and 3 years (1993-1995) after the introduction of incentives, based on a defined cohort of 233 general practitioners in the area of one health board. GPs were divided into tertiles based on their performance against their prescribing budgets into 'savers' (generally underspent and received incentive payments), modest overspenders and large overspenders. RESULTS: Savers were always lower cost prescribers than the other groups. They contained their rate and costs of prescribing in contrast to the other groups, e.g. percentage rise in prescribing costs in the year after the introduction of the scheme -7.9%, +1.2% and +7.3% respectively, (P < 0.05) for savers, modest overspenders and large overspenders respectively. This effect was short lived however and was gone by the third year of the study. CONCLUSIONS: The financial incentives had a marked effect on prescribing volume and cost on some practices who could achieve targets and hence incentive payments. The incentives had little effect on high spending practices. Such incentive schemes need careful evaluation if they are not to become perverse to the good health of patients.